Devaluation Expectations: The Swedish Krona 1982-1991 by Hans Lindberg et al.
NBER WORKING PAPERS SERIES




Working Paper No. 3918




The authors thank Avinash Dixit. Lars HOrngren, Andrew Rose.
Anders Vredin and participants in seminars at lIES, the Economic
Council, andSverigesRiksbank for coimuents and Bank of Sweden
Tercentennary Foundation, Jan Wallander Foundation, the Social
Science Research Council1 and Sveriges Riksbank for financial
support. One part of the research for this paper was performed
while Paul Soderlind was a visiting scholar at Sveriges Riksbank,
another part was performed when Hans Lindberg was a visiting
scholar at lIES; Lindberg and Sederlind thank their hosts for the
hospitality. This paper is part of NEER's research program in
International Studies. Anyopinionsexpressed are those of the
authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research
or those of Sveriges Riksbank.NBER Working Paper #3918
November 1991
DEVALUATION EXPECTATIONS:
THE SWEDISH KRONA 1982-1991
ABSTRACT
Devaluation expectations for the Swedish krona are estimated
for the period 1982-1991 with several methods. First the
•sixtiplest test is applied under either only the minimal
assumption of TMno positive minimum profit or the additional
assumption of uncovered interest parity. Then a more precise
method suggested by Bertola and Svensson is used, in which
expected rates of depreciation within the exchange rate band,
estimated in several ways, are subtracted from interest rate
differentials. In addition the probability density of the time
of devaluations is estimated. Finally, estimated devaluation
expectations are to some extent explained by a few macrovariables
and parliament elections.
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This paper provides a comprehensive study of devaluation expectations for the
Swedish krona during theperiodJanuary 1982-February 1991.During this period
Sveriges Riksbank (the central bank of Sweden) unilaterally defended a fixed exchange
rate regime, in which the krona was allowed to fluctuate in a narrow band around a
central parity defined in terms of a basket of foreign currencies. On one occasion during
the period, on October 8, 1982, the krona was devalued. On this occasion, and on several
other occasions during the period, devaluation rumors circulated, interest rate differentials
between krona and foreign-currency denominated assets rose, and capital outflows
occurred.In this paper devaluation expectations are estimated for the period in a
systematic way with several methods, with increasing sophistication and precision.'
A "naive" estimate of devaluation expectations is the interest rate differential
between interest rates on krona denominated and foreign-currency denominated deposits
and bonds.This estimate is naive and potentially misleading because interest rate
differentials are also affected by expected exchange rate movements inside the band. The
paper employs several alternatives to the naive estimate. First, the "simplest test" of
target zone credibility, described in Svensson (1991b), is undertaken, with only the
minimal assumption of "no positive minimum profit."By adding assumption of
uncovered interest parity, we can calculate the maximum and minimum expected rate of
devaluation. Then a more precise method to estimated expected rates of devaluation,
suggested by Bero1a and Svensson (1990), is employed. The estimated expected rates of
devaluation are constructed by subtracting estimates of expected rates of exchange rate
depreciation within the band from the interest rate differentials. The expected rates of
IForalternative empirical approaches to target zone credibility see for instance
Bartolini and Bodnar (1991), Bertola and Caballero (1990) Bodnar (1991), Collins (1986),
Edin and Vredin (1991), Fratianni and von Hagen (19905, Giovannini (1990),Svensson
(1991b) and Weber (199la,b).2
depreciation within the band are estimated with &varietyof methods and !pecifications.2
The Bertola-Svensson method is extended to include an estimation of the probability
density of the timing of a devaluation, by using interest rate differentials and estimated
expected rates of depreciation within the band for several different maturities.
The paper also examines whether the estimated devaluation expectations can be
explained by macro variables like the current account, the real exchange rate and the rate
of unemployment.
Section II presents some details on the Swedish exchange rate regime and the data
used.Section HI explains the methods used, section IV presents the results of the
simplest test, and section V presents the results of the more precise estimation of
devaluation expectations.Section VI examines whether the estimated devaluation
expectations can be explained by macro variables, and section VII concludes. An
appendix includes some technical details on stochastic processes that model realignments.
2TheBertola-Svensson method has been empirically implemented by Rose and
Svensson (1991) on French franc/Deutsche mark exchange rates during the EMS, and by
Frankel and Phithps (1991) and Svensson (1991a) on all EMS exchange rates. Frankel
and Phillips use survey data on exchange rate erpectations rather than interest rate
differentials and uncovered interest parity.3
II. The Swedish Exchange Rate Band
In August 1977 Sweden devaluedandwithdrewfrom the thenexisting system of
European exchange rate collaboration (known as the snake). Instead, a unilateral target
zonewasestablished. An exchangerateindex was defined as the exchange rate between
the krona and an announcedtrade-weighted currencybasketconsistingof the currencies
of Sweden's fifteen largest trade partners with convertible currencies. The central parity
of the basket exchange rate was initially set to 100. At the devaluation on September 14,
1981, the central parity was changed to 111 and at the latest devaluation on October 8,
1982, to 132. The exchange rate band was officially declared to be *1.5 percent in June
26, 1985. For the earlier period, Sveriges Riksbank claims to have been defending an
unofficial band of *2.25 percent. The system with the currency index was abandoned on
May 17, 1991, when Sveriges Riksbank unilaterally pegged the krona to the theoretical
ecu. This measure was not accompanied by any realignment of the krona and the width of
the band was kept unchanged at *1.5%.
The data used in this study are daily and cover the period January 1, 1982-
February 1?, 1991. Interest rates on Euro-currency deposits and spot exchange rates were
obtained from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The interest rates on
deposits denominated in basket currency were constructed from the Euro-rates according
to the currencies' effective weights in the currency basket. The Swedish currency index
was obtained from Sveriges Riksbank. Lindberg and Soderlind (1991b) provide a detailed
description of the data and some basic statistics.
Diagram2.1 showsthe Swedish currency index. The exchange rate band is marked
with dotted lines in the diagram. Diagram 2.2a-dshowthe interest rate differentials
(expressed as annualized rates of return) between Swedish krona Euro-deposits and
basket-currency Euro-deposits carrying a fixed maturity of 1, 3, 6, and 12 months,
respectively. The dates of the latest devaluation (October 8, 1982) and the narrowing of4
theexchange rate band (June 27, 1985)aremarked with vertical dotted lines in the
diagram. The interest rate differentials have fluctuated substantially, but usually above
the zero level. At certain instances, as in 1985 and 1990, they have reached a level of
about 8 percent. Suth large levels of interest rate differentials surely suggest the presence
of devaluation expectations, but we will be able to measure devaluation expectations with
much better precision below.
Dl. Extracting Devaluation Expectations
A. The simplest test of target zone credibility
We begin by outlining "the simplest test" of target zone credibility described in
Svensson (lQQIb). Let St denote the (spot) exchange rate at time t, measured in units of
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency (or in index units), and letand Sdenote
the lower and upper edge of the exchange rate band at time,
(3.1) ￿
The simplest test under the minimal assumption of no positive mini mum profit
Letdenote the forward exchange rate at time t for maturity r (expressed in years))
The net profit at maturity time t+r froma forward sale of one unit foreign currency is
FT S tt+f
Suppose that with certainty at time t no realignment or change in the bandwidth is
expected up to and including the maturity time t+r. Then, the spot exchange rate at
time t+r is expected with certainty to remain within the exchange rate band, S ￿ 5t+r 1
S.It follows that the net profit from a forward sale of one unit foreign currency is
bounded according to
3Theforward exchange rate is the price measured in units of domestic currency per
unit of foreign currency (or in index units) and contracted at time t to be paid at time t+r
for receiving one unit of foreign currency (or one unit of the currency basket) at time t+ r:5
(3.2) S F-F-
We see from (3.2)that lithe forwardexchange rate is above the exchange rate band
(Fi> Se), the minimum profit from a forward sale of foreign currency is positive. Thus,
although the precise level of profit is uncertan, it is certain that it will be positive and
above a certain minimum level. This arbitrage possibility would give incentives for
investors to sell increasing amounts of foreign currency forward until the profit
opportunity is eliminated. If the forward exchange rate remains above the exchange rate
band, it must be the case that the exchange rate target zone is not completely credible, in
the following sense: The upper edge of the exchange rate band at time t+r must with
positive probability be expected to increase to a level above the forward exchange rate,
either because of an upward realignment of the central parity at constant bandwidth (a
devaluation), or an increase in the bandwidth (including a regime shift to a free float), or
both.
Similarly, we also see from (3.2) that if the forward exchange rate is below the
exchange rate band (F <S),the minimum profit from a forward purchase of foreign
currency is positive. In this case investors that believed in the fixity of the target zone
would buy foreign currency forward. If the forward rate is not (instantaneously) moved
back inside the band the exchange rate target zone cannot be completely aedible, and the
lower edge of the exchange rate band at time t+r must with positive probability be
expected to decreasetoa level below the forward exchange rate.
Let us formally state the assumption of no positive minimum profit:theminimum
profit (from a forward transaction) cannot be positive. Then we can summarize the
simplest test of target zone credibility under the minimal assumption of no positive
minimum profit:
(0Ifthe forward exchange rate falls outside the exchange rate band, the exchange rate
target zone is not credible, in theprecisesensethat the exchangerate bandis withpositive
probabilityexpected to shifttoinclude theforward exchangerate, either by a realignment or6
an increase in the bandwidth, or both.
(ii) If the forward exchange rate is inside the exchange rateband, thetest is
inconclusive and the exchange rate target zonemayormaynot becredible.
Coveredinterest panty
In the test Just mentioned market forward exchange rates can be used. Alternatively,
under the assumption of covered interest parity, forward and spot exchange rates are
related to the spot exchange rate and domestic and foreign currency interest rates, and
forward exchange rates can easily be computed from the latter. This is what we will do in
practice below.4 5
13.A maximal bound for the expected rate of zealignment
It will be practical to introduce the logarithms of the exchange rate and its band.
Therefore, let s1,andbe the natural logarithms of SI,and S, so the exchange rate
4Moreprecisely, introduce a home currency interest rate i and a foreign currency
interestrate (or a currency basket interestrate)if, both for discount
deposits/bills/bonds of the same default-risk and the same maturity r> 0. (The interest
rates are expressed as annualized rates of return, to allow comparison across maturities.)
Under the assumption of covered interest parity, the forward exchange rates fulfills
=S1[(l+i)/(l+iT)]T.For example, if the 1-month domestic and foreign currency
interest rates are 18 and 6 percent year expressed as annualized rates of return, the
1-month forward exchange rate is S[(l + .18)/(l + .06)]1/12.
If interest rates are expressed not as annualized rates of return (i) but as simple
annualized rates (ii) (which is normally the case for maturities below one year), covered
interest parity can be written on the form=S/1+ir)/(i+ifr)(where r is
expressed in years). [The annualized rates of return and the simpie annualized rates are
related by (1 + E1+ i27.]
5Empiricalwork has confirmed that covered interest parity is a realistic assumption.
For Sweden it holds very well (see Lindberg (1991)).7
bandcan be expressed as
(3.3) 5
Furthermore,introduce (the natural logarithm of) the central parity,
(3.4) Ct +
A realignment is a jump in the central parity. Between realignments the central parity is
constant.
Next, let us introduce
(3.5) E — C1,
theexchange rate's (log) deviation from the central parity. We shall informally refer to
as the exchange rate within the band.Finally,let i (- s)/2,so the exchange rate
band (in logs) is e3 around the central parity, with the bandwidth 21 It follows that the
exchange rate within the band will fulfill
(3.6) -<x￿i
Let us from now on assume that the bandwidth is not svbject to change. The only
possible change in the exchange rate regime is therefore a change in central parity, a
realignment.
It will be practical, in particular for comparison across different maturities, to
consider rates of realignment rather than the absolute sizes of realignments. Let us
therefore rewrite the central parity as c1 s —
x1,and let us write the (average) rate of
realignment from time t to time t+r as zc14jr ast+Jr —Axt+/r,where is a
simplified notation for C17- c1,the backward r-length difference of It
follows that
(3.7) EtLCt+r/T E ELASt+T/T —
wheredenotes expectations conditional upon information available at time t. Thatis,
theexpected rate of realignment equalsthe expected(total) rate of depreciation minus the
expected rate of depreciation within the band.S
Interpretation of the expected rateofrealignment
Let us extend on how the expected rate of realignment can be interpreted. At a
realignment central parity jumps to a new level and remains constant there until the next
realignment. Market expectations of realignments will be modeled in the following way.
First, let us assume that at most one realignment is expected to occur within the
maturities we shall consider (up to 12 months). Although this assumption is certainly
innocuous for short maturities, it may not be realistic for maturities around 12 month in
all circumstances.There were for instance three realignments of the Belgian
franc/Deutsche mark exchange rate between September 1981 and September 1982 (see
Ungerer, ilauvonen, Lopez-Claros and Mayer (1990)).Butwe argue that the assumption
is realistic for the Swedish krona during the sample period, 1982—1991. The economic
debate during this period made it clear that what was at stake was whether there would
be zero or one (fairly sizeable) devaluation, and the possibility of having several (smaller)
devaluations during a 12 month period can certainly be disregarded. We shall also see
below that the expected rate of devaluation dropped down to zero for some lime after the
devaluation of the krona 1982.6 (For the case when more than one realignment can occur
within the mauturities considered, see the Appendix.)
Let p be the probability at time t of a realignment during the period from time t up to
and including time t+r. During the time interval r central parity
Ctremainsconstant
with probability 1 -p,whereas it takes a jump of independent random sizewith
probability p. It follows that the expected change in central parity, the expected
realignment, can be written
(3.8) Et[Acg+7]= (1—p).O+PEtEAct+lrea1ignmentJ
=p.EjAct+Irealignrnent],
6Theassumption of at most one expected realignment within a 12 month horizon is
also supported by the empirical results in Rose and Svensson (1991) for the FF/DM
exchange rate, and in Svensson (1991a) for other EMS DM exchange rates, in that the
expected rate of devaluation usually drops to around zero for some time after a
realignment.9
where Ejtàct realignment] denotes the expected conditional realignment size
(conditional upon a realignment). (The expected conditional realignment size is positive
if a devaluation is expected, negative if a revaluation is expected.) That is, the expected
realignment is the productof the probabihty of a realignment duringthe time to maturity
and tue expectedconditionalrealignment size.
Definethe (expected average) frequency ofrealignmentduring the time to maturity as
p/r.7Itfollows that the expected rateof realignmentin (3.7) can be written as
(3.9) Et[icj÷]/r =u.E1[Ac1,.I realignment].
The expected rate of realignment isthe product of the frequencyofrealignment andthe
expectedconditional realignment size.
Uncovered interest parity
Let i —If denotethe home country's interest rate differential at time t for
maturity r. Then uncovered interest parity can be expressed as
(3.10) =EtLt+rI/
That is, the interest rate differential eQuals the expected rate of depreciation to maturity.
Uncovered interest parity is a good approximation if the foreign exchange risk premium is
small. Svensson (1990) argues that the foreign exchange risk premium is likely to be small
in exchange rate target zones, even when there is devaluation risk.
7Forshort maturities the frequency of realignment is approximately equal to the
"intensity" of realignment, the instantaneous average rate at which realignments occur.
These concepts are further discussed below and in the Appendix.
Svensson (1990) shows that the foreign exchange risk premium for an imperfectly
credible exchange rate band with devaluation risk has two components: one arising from
exchange rate uncertainty due to exchange rate movements within the band, and the
other arising from exchange rate uncertainty due to realignments of the band. The first
component is undoubtedly likely to be very small, since conditional exchange rate
variability inside the band is smaller than conditional exchange rate variability in a free
float, and since fordgn exchange risk premia even in a free float appear to be fairly small.
The second component is likely to be much larger then the first, but still of moderate size:
Even with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 8 and an expected conditional
devaluation size of 10 percent, the foreign exchange risk premium is no more than 1/5 of
the total interest rate differential. Hence at least 4/5 of the interest rate differential10
It iswellknown that uncovered interest parity has been rejected in a large number of
empiricaltests (see Hodrick (1987) and Froot and Thaler(1990)). The standardtest of
whether the forward exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future exchange rate is
misleading for exchange rates within exchange rate bands with realignment risk. This is
so since the realignment risk is just one example of the well-known Peso problem, which
undermines the standard unbiasedness test. Put differently, with realignment risk there is
the problem that the sample distribution may not be representative of the underlying
distribution of the error term, unless the sample includes a large number of realignments)
Interestingly, for the French franciUM exchange rate, which has experienced a few
realignments, there is actually empirical support for uncovered interest parity, as noted by
Rose and Svensson (1991).
For the rest of this paper we shall assume uncovered interest parity. From uncovered
interest parity it follows that (3.7) can be written
(3.11) Etact+/r= 6- E(sx,.Jr.
The expected rate of realignment is equal to the interest rate differential minus the expected
rateofdepreciation within the band. Asobserved by Bertola andSvensson(1990),
equation (3.11) has empirical implications: In order to find an estimate of the expected
rate of realignment, EAct÷7/r, it is suf6dent to find an estimate of Et.Axt+,.Jri the
expected rate of depredation within the band, and simply subtract that estimate from the
interest rate differential.
remains to be explained by something other than the foreign exchange risk premium.
Frankej and Phillips (1991) rely on exchange rate surveys rather than uncovered
interest parity and interest rate differentials. They report similar results as Rose and
Svensson (1991), which to some extent supports the assumption of uncovered interest
parity.
V The possibility of occasional jumps in floating exchange rates casts doubts about
unbiasedness tests of floating exchange rates, too.11
Amaximal bound for the expected rate of realignment
Atthisstagewe can define maximal bounds for the expected rate of realignment.
Later we shall present more precise estimates of the expected rate of realignment. From
(36) it follows the rate of depreciation within the band is bounded according to
(3.12) (-}- x)fr ￿ Axt+/r < (i — rt)/r.
It follows that the expected rate of depreciation within the band must also be bounded in
the same way. Substitution of these bounds into (3.11) results in bounds for the expected
rate of realignment,'°
(3.13) -- xt)/r ￿ Ec1+/r￿5 - (- — z)/r.
Empiricalestimation of the the expected rate of depreciation in (3.11) allows a more
precise estimate of the expected rate of realignment than provided by the bounds in
(3.13). This will be the subject below. Before that, we shall mention three possible
alternative simple assumptions about the expected rate of depredation within the band.
These assumptions allow a more precise, but not necessarily more correct, estimate of the
expected rate of realignment.
10From(3.13) follows a second test of target zone credibility: (i) If b -( — xt)/r>0,
we must have Et.Act+,./r >0,thatis,a positive expected rate of realignment (an expected
devaluation).(ii) IfS -(-.i
—zt)/r<0,we must have EtAC2+,.Jr <0,that is, anegative
expectedrate of realignment (an expected revaluation).(iii)Otherwise, the test is
inconclusiveand theexpected rate of devaluation may be positive,negativeor zero.
Itmay appear that this second test uses uncovered interest parity, since we have
indeed referred to uncovered interest parity in deriving it. flowever, the test only needs
covered interest parity and the assumption of unchanged bandwidth, in which case it is
identical to the the previous test mentioned.
More precisely, using the approximation hi(1+i) i, covered interest parity can be
written in the convenient loglinear form, (ftr- s1)/r=5,where .çisthe natural
logarithm of F2. That is, the forward premium per unit maturity equals the interest rate
differentiaLSubstitution of this into (3.13) leads to (ItT— t)ITCEttsct+7./r￿
(ItT —§)/T, whichis under the assumption of unchanged bandwidth equivalent to the first
test.12
C. Po6sible assumptions about the expected rate of depredation within the band
The first simple assumption is that the exchange rate within the band is a martingale,
that is, EF1+r1 which implies a zero expected rate of depreciation within the band,
Etart+1/r
0.Then the expected rate of depredation in (3.11) is simply equal to the
interest rate differential,
(3.14) EA cj+/r= 5,
and the interest rate differential can be used as a direct quantitative estimate of the
expected rate of realignment. Empirically, exchange rates are normally found to behave
like a random walk, a special case of a martingale. Exchange rates within bands cannot
literally be random walks —justbecause of the boundaries. It is comforting that the
hypothesis that the exchange rate within the band follows a random walk is empirically
rejected below Ii
Asecond simple assumption, dearly unrealistic, is that market agents have perfect
foresight about exchange rate movements within the band, that is Eft÷7't+r' which
implies EtAxt÷/r -x)/r.Then the expected rate of realignment fulfills
(3.15) EjzXct÷7Jr =82- -
andthe interest rate differential adjusted for the actual cx post rate of depredation for the
band can be used as a quantitative estimate of the expected rate of realignment.
A third simple assumption is that the exchange rate within the band reverts to the
middle of the band, that is, Etxt+0, which implies E1AXt+r/T—xjr.Then the
expected rate of realignment fulfills
(3.16) EtA ct÷TIr= —
andthe interest rate differential adjusted for this mean reversion of the exchange rate
within the band is a quantitative estimate of the expected rate of realignment. Below we
'IThehypothesis of a random walk (a unit root) for the exchange rate within the band
has been rejected by Lindberg and Soderlind (199Th) for the Swedish currency index, by
Rose and Svensson (1991) for the FF/DM exchange rate, and by Svensson (1991a) for the
other EMS DM exchange rates (except the lira/DM rate).13
shall see that this assumption will to some extent be confirmed (or longer maturities.
Now we shall go on to discuss the empirical estimation of the expected rate of
depreciation within the band.
D. Empirical estimation of the erpected rate of depreciation within the band
The most precise estimation of the expected rate of realignment is by empirically
estimating the expected rate of depredation within the band, and then adjusting the
interest rate differentials by subtracting the latter estimate, according to (3.11). If the
exchange rate within the band were a martingale, the adjustment would be meaningless
and the interest rate differentials would be the best estimate of the expected rate of
realignment. However, we will be able to reject the closely related hypothesis that the
exchange rate within the band is a random walk, and we will show that the exchange rate
within the band actually displays strong mean reversion. Therefore, the estimation of the
expected rate of depreciation within the band will indeed be essential for a precise
estimation of the expected rate of realignment.
The estimation of the expected rate of depredation within the band is made a bit
complicated by the fact that the exchange rate within the band may take a jump at a
realignment (recall that a realignment is defined as a jump in central parity).For
instance, at EMS realignments usually the exchange rate for a "weak" currency (that is, a
currency that is devalued) jumps from a position near the "weak" edge of the old
exchange rate band to a position near or at the "strong" edge of the new exchange rate
band. Therefore, the jump in the exchange rate is usually less than the jump in the
central parity. Sometimes when the realignment is small and the new band overlaps with
the old, there is no jump at all in the exchange rate.
It is complicated to estimate the expected rate of depreciation within the band
inclusive of possible jumps inside the band at realignments, since there may be relatively
few realignments and the sample distribution of realignments may not be representative.14
Then expectations of realignments and jumps inside the band may introduce a Peso
problem in the estimation of the expected rate of depredation within the band. For these
reasons it seems safer to estimate the expected rate of depredation within the band
conditional upon no realignment.'2 This practice, however, has consequences for the
estimation of the expected rate of realignment that need to be clarified.
Hence, let us expand the expected change of the exchange rate within the band in two
components,
(3.17) (1-pE1[Ax1Ino realignment] + pE[&1IrealignmentJ
Et[axt+Ino realignment]
—
P2{Et[xt+no realignment] —Et[x+r' realignment]},
where we recall that p is the probability of a realignment from date up to and including
date t-i-r (and "realignment" means that a realignment occurs sometime during the period
from date t to t+r). It follows from (3.17) that (3.11) can be written as
(3.18)EtIaCt+ ]f+p{Et{xt÷I realignmentj —Et[xt+71no realignmentj)/r
=- Ejz1r1÷no realignment]/ r.
We shall use the left-hand side of (3.18) as our operational definition of the expected rate
of devaluation and denote it by g (if it is positive a devaluation is expected, if it is
negative a revaluation is expected). Hence, by (3.18) the expected rate of devaluation
equaLsthedifference betweenthe interestrate differential and the expected rate of
depreciation within the band conditional upon no realignment.
The expected rate of devaluation as we have defined it differs from the expected rate
of realignment by the second term on the left-hand side in (3.18). Tn order to understand




12Forour sample of data about the Swedish krona there is no real alternative but to
estimate the expected rate of depredation within the band conditional upon no




is the expectedconditional det'aluation size (conditionalupon a realignment between date t
anddate t+r),andwhere we recall thatE p/risthe frequency of realignment. Hence,
the expected rate of devaluation is the product of the frequency of realignment and the
excpected conditional devaluation size. The expected conditional devaluation size is the
sum of the expected conditional realignment size and the difference between the expected
exchange rate at maturity conditional upon a realignment and the expected exchange rate
at maturity conditional upon no realignment. Consider the latter difference. If the
maturity rapproacheszero, the difference approaches the jump in the exchange rate
within the band at a realignment. Then the expected conditional devaluation size is the
expected actual jump in the (total) exchange rate at a realignment, which differs from the
jump in central parity by the jump in the exchange rate within the band. lithe maturity
rbecomeslarge, the difference becomes small. Then the expected conditional devaluation
sizeisdose to the expected conditional realignment size.
B. The Expected Timing of a Realignment
With a more specific model of the realignments/devaluation process, it is possible to
infer the expected timing of a realignment from estimated erpected rates of devaluation
for different maturities (see the Appendix for details). Let us for given t consider the time
period [t,t+r}(0r).Asbefore, we assume that there is a nite >0,such that the
possibility of more than one realignment during (t,t+]canbe disregarded (}willequal
one year).13
13Such a stochastic process differs from a standard marked (or compound) Poisson
process in that it has time-varying intensity and, more fundamentally,that it has
memory. Previous realizations of the process affect future realizations, in contrast tothe
fundamental property of Poisson processes that increments are independent- The present
process is an example of a "self-exciting" stochastic process (see Snyder (1975)and the
A ppen dix).16
Let us the specify that at time I a first realignment is expected to occur during the
period [t,t+r] (r ￿ 0) according to the intensity fttncliol2 X1(r) ￿ 0 (r ￿ 0) and that the
possibility of a second realignment during {t,t÷}] can be disregarded. The intensity
function has the interpretation that conditional upon a realignment not occurring during
[t,t+r}, the probability of a realignment occurring during the small interval [t÷r,t+r+arj
(r>0) is + o(Ar).14 Let the associated parameter function A/r) he the
integral of the intensity function, At(r) =joT A(u)du.Clearly the parameter function will




The (unconditional) probability of a realignment occurring during the small interval
Lt+r,t+r+r1 is y1(r)Ar, where c(r) denotes the probability density function of the
time to rea]ignment, given by
(3.21) =A(r)exp[-A/r)].
The expected time to a realignment, T, is then given by15
(3.22) =jrç(r)dr.
Let the expected conditional devaluation size, ,beindependent of the maturity and
denoted by .Theexpected devaluation during [t,t+r), 4r, fulfills= according
to (3.18). Conditional upon a given i an estimate of the probability of a devaluation
follows from the estimated expected rate of devaluation for a particular maturity,
(3.23)
'4Thenotation o(Lir) means lima o(Ar)/r =0.
ISFora constant intensity across maturities, A1(r)A, we have the familiar results from
the standard Poisson process: p =1-exp[-ArJ,cfr) =Aexp[-Ar](the exponential
distribution), and =1/A(except that p should then be interpreted as the probability
of one or more realignments between date t and date 1+ r).17
From this we can extract the intensity function. First, it follows that we get associated
estimates, or observations, of the parameter function,
(3.24) A1(r) a -ln(1 -
forthe maturities for which we have data. Second, we can the fit a function A1(r)(0￿ r
) tothese observations (and also use that A1(0) =0),restricting the function to be at
least piece-wise differentiable. Third, we can then construct an estimate of the intensity
function by
(3.25) DAt(r)/Or,
forr for which the estimated parameter function is differentiable. The simplest way,
whichwe shall use, is to make the parameter function piece-wise linear by connecting the
observations with straight lines, and then let the estimates of the intensity function be
given by the slopes of these lines.'6
From the estimates of the intensity and parameter functions we can then compute an
estimate of the probability density function for the time to a realignment,
(3.26) Wt(T) a
Finally, an estimate of the expected time to a realignment, Tt, can be computed by
numeric integration of Jrc(r)draccording to (3.22) (given as assumption about how
the estimated density function is extrapolated beyond the maturitites for which data
exist).
Let us also relate the (expected average) frequency of realignment, v = tothe
intensity function. We exploit that A(r) —ln(l -vr)and At(r)OAér)/Or. It
follows that
(3.27) A1(r) a+ r3v/dr]/(l -
16Thisprocedure does not ensure that the parameter function is non-decreasing, so
some intensities may become negative. A more sophisticated estimation of the parameter
function is of course to select a set of feasible parameter functions (non-decreasing, going
through (0,0), and appropriately smooth) and then fit a feasible [unction to the points
(r,—ln(l—p)) according to a suitable loss function.18
For short maturities the intensity and the frequency are approximately equal. In general
the intensity is the marginal rate of realignment, conditional upon no previous
realignment whereas the frequency of realignment is the unconditional average frequency
of realignment.
IV. The Simplest Test of Target Zone Credibility for the Swedish Krona
We follow the methodology outlined in section mAandmake the a.ssuinption of no
positive minimum profit: the minimum profit from a transaction in the forward currency
market cannot be positive.
Diagram 4.)showsthe 1, 3, 6 and 12 month forward exchange rate (expressed in
percentage deviation from central parity). The position of the exchange rate band is
marked with dotted horizontal lines. As before, the two dotted vertical lines represent the
latest devaluation (October 8, 1982) and the date when the bandwidth was reduced and
made public (June 27, 1985). A few things are worth noting. The 1-month forward
exchange rate is always inside the band. The simplest test is thus inconclusive for the
whole period on a 1-month horizon, that is, the exchange rate bandmay or ulay not have
been credible. If we look at the longer terms this has not always been the case. The 6 and
12-month forward rates were above the upper edge of the band at the time before the
devaluation of 1982. This indicates that the devaluation 1982 was expected. The 3, 6 and
12-month forward rate were also above the upper edge during the spring of 1985. In a
way it is rather surprising that the target zone was not credible at that time, since the
Swedish economy then seemed rather healthy. However, there were rumors about a
devaluation in conjunction with the general election in September 1985 (the devaluation
in 1982 occurred after a general election). Furthermore, the exchange rate band was not
public at the time. The market may have expected the target zone to be wider than the
actual e225%, During the following years the 12-month forward rate was frequently well19
above the upper edge of the target zone The 3 and 6—month forward rates cross the
upper edge of the band on two occasions: in February 1990 and at the end of 1990.
Thus, from the 3, 6 and 12-month forward rates we can conclude that the Swedish
exchange rate band has lacked credibility quite often during 1982-1991, in the sense that
the central parity or the bandwidth, or both, have been expected to increase with positive
probability.
Now, let us assume that the bandwidth has not been expected to increase. Then, it
must be the case that a realignment, that is, an upward shift of the central parity, is
expected when the forward rate is above the upper edge of the band. Moreover, if we
assume uncovered interest parity we can interpret the forward exchange rates as expected
future exchange rates. Then, it is possible to compute the maximal bound of the expected
rate of realignment from (3.13).
Diagram 4.2a-d shows the maximal bounds for the expected rate of realignment for
the maturities 1, 3, 6, and 12 months (note that the vertical scale in Diagram 4.2a differs
from that in Diagram 4.2b-d). The maximal bounds, or what we might call "100percent
confidence intervals," provide us with all possible information that earlier was obtained
from Diagram 3.1: the minimum and maximum expected rate of realignment have the
same (opposite) sign when the forward rate is outside (inside) the band. In addition, the
diagrams tells us that the confidence interval is wider for shorter maturities. For
instance, the maximal bound for the 1-month expected rate of realignment in
Diagram 4.2a is. 18 percent per year, while the maximal bound for the 12-month in
Diagram 4.2d is 1.5 percent per year. This stems from the fact that the maximum bound
for the expected rate of depredation within the band is wider for shorter maturities. This
reveals why the simplest test of target zone credibility tends to be inconclusive for shorter
maturities. It also suggests that the predsion could be improved, especially on short
horizons, by obtaining a point estimate (with proper confidence intervals) of the expected
rate of depredation within the band.20
V. A More Precise Estimation of Devaluation Expectations
A. Estimation of Expected Depredation within the Band
In order to estimate the expected rate of devaluation, we shall consequently estimate
the conditional expectation of the future rate of depredation within the band conditional
upon no realignment, E{Axt+Ino realignzuent)/r E{x1 -znorealignment]/r.
This is equivalent to estimating the conditional expectation of the future exchange rate
within the band, Et!rt+Inorealignment}.We find it illuminating to discuss the
estimation in terms of the expected future exchange rate.
Expected future exchange rates
Letus first consider what the theory predicts about the expected future exchange rate
within the band. In the Bertola-Svensson (1990) model the only determinant of the
expected future exchange rate within the band is the current exchange rate within the
band, rt. The expected future exchange rate within the band, considered a function of the
current exchange rate and the time interval, can be computed as the solution to a partial
differential equation, the Kolmogorov backward equation, With appropriate initial and
boundary conditions. This is done in Svensson (1991c) for the target zone model with
only marginal interventions, and in Lindberg and SOderlind (1991a) for a target zone
model with intra-marginal interventions as well. Although the computations are a bit
complicated, the main result is simple and intuitive.
Diagram 5.1, taken from Lindberg and Soderlind (1991a), shows the th©retical
expected future exchange rate (conditional upon no realignment), plotted against the
current exchange rate, for the maturities 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. The exchange rate within
the band displays mean reversion. The mean reversion is stronger for longer maturities.
For an infinite maturity the expected future exchange rate within the band would be
constant and equal to its unconditional mean. However, already for 6 and 12 months21
maturity the expected future exchange rate is fairly flat.Furthermore, for finite
maturities the relationship between the expected future exchange rate within the band
and the current exchange rate within the band is non—linear and S-shaped, although for
typical parameters the relationship is dose to linear. The non-linearity is hardly visible
in Diagram 5.111
The theory hence suggests that the linear approximation,
(5.1) E1r1+7 =i3+
may be adequate. The parametersandcan then be estimated by regression of the
future exchange rate on the current exchange rate according to the equation
(5.2) 2:t+ =+fl1:1 + (4
whereby rational expectations Ejj+7 =0and EF1C£+=
Near-linearitymay only arise for some parameters and some model variants.
Therefore, we shall include as a test of possible non-linearity the square and the cube of
the current exchange rate among the explanatory variables as well as estimating a logistic
transformation of (5.2). We shall also use locally weighted regression as a nonparametric
method to capture any nonlinearity.
Since our estimation need not presuppose either the Bertola—Syensson model or any
other specific target zone model, we shall also allow variants of (5.2) with additional
explanatory variables besides the current exchange rate within the band1 namely lags of
exchange rates within the band, a seasonal variable, and the interest rate differential.
The expected future exchange rate is estimated on our daily data for the maturities
r= 1,3, 6 and 12 months (r= 1/12,1/4, 1/2 and 1 years). The total sample period from
January 1, 1982, to February 17, 1991 is divided into two subsamples, "regimes," before
ITDiagram5.i is computed with the aggregate fundamental being a reflected Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process with a drift function with zero intercept and slope equal to —2, a rate of
variance of the aggregate fundamental equal to 1 percent/year (corresponding to an
instantaneous standard deviation of 10 percent/y5), and a semi-elasticity of money
demand (a) equal to 3 years.22
andafterJune 27, 1985,which isthe date when the exchange rate band was reduced from
*225 percent to &1.5 percent and publicly announced.Hence regime I runs from
January 1, 1982, to June 26, 1985, and regime H from June 27, 1985, to February 17,
1991. Since we wish to estimate the expected future exchange rate conditional upon no
realignment, the observations within the time interval rbeforethe realignment on
October 8, 1982, are excluded from regime I (which excludes the jump in the exchange
rate within the band at the realignment). In addition the month after the realignment
(one month corresponds to about 22 daily observations) is also excluded."
The expected future exchange rate within the band is estimated separately for each
regime and maturity. The estimation of equation (5.2) is complicated by several factors.
First, the "overlapping observations" problem (the sampling interval is shorter than the
forecasting horizon) results in serially correlated error terms (see Hansen and Hodrick
(1980)). Second, since the expected future exchange rate within the band cannot be
outside the band, the error terms must be realizations from a distribution with a finite
support. Third, a wide class of exchange rate band models suggests that the error terms
are likely to be heteroskedastic with a non-normal shape of the conditional distribution
(also within the band), mainly due to the stabilizing effect of the boundaries.
Equation (5.2) and its variants have been estimated with several different methods.
First, we have used OLS with Newey-West (1987) standard errors which allows for
heteroskedastic and serially correlated error terms. We have chosen the number of
off-diagonal bands in the error covariance matrix equal to the number of observations
corresponding to r,sinceour observations are overlapping by r. This method has also
been implemented as recursive least squares (RLS) with a moving window of fixed length,
'Thelatter exclusion is made on a purely judgmental basis. Immediately after the
realignment the exchange rate within the band was positioned close to the lower edge of
the exchange rate band. During the month following the realignment the exchange rate
within the band increased steadily until the middle of the band was reached. Thisprocess
was by all likelihood geared by Riksbank interventions and seems to be a unique event.
Since we believe that this episode was atypical, we prefer to exclude it from the
regressions.23
which allows for parameters changing gradually over time.19Second, we have used
(lARCH as in Bollerslev (1986) to allow for conditional heteroskedastidty of error terms,
with and without the moving average adjustment of Baillie and Bollerslev (1990).20Third
we have used a nonparametric method, locally weighted regression (LWR), as described in
Cleveland, Devlin and Grosse (1990) and Diebold and Nason (1990), which allows for
arbitrary (smooth) nonlinearity. Fourth, we have used an autoregressive method in order
to handle the serial correlation of the residuals.
The different estimation methods and the different variants of (5.2) result in a large
number of estimates of the expected future exchaxge rate within the hand. In the choice
between these estimates, in addition to relying on standard statistical criteria, we exclude
estimates that are "unreasonable." We consider an estimate unreasonable if either of two
conditions are fulfilled: (1) the estimate of the expected future exchange rate within the
band is outside the band, and (2) the estimate of the coefficientfor the current
exchange rate in (5.2) is significantly negative. Condition (1) is obvious. Condition (2) is
motivated by the theoretical result in Diagram 5.1, and in particular it excludes the fairly
bizarresituationswhen the expected future exchange rate is closer to the strong edge of
the band the closer the current exchange rate is to the weak edge of the band.
The estimation method and equation variant that consistently seem to give the most
sensible estimates are OLS and (5.2) without any additional explanatory variables. The
result of that estimation is reported in Table 5.! and illustrated in Diagrams 5.2 and 5•3•21
' RLSon (5.2) are done in the following way. Consider a window of fixed integer
size w. Construct the estimates and by OLS regression of the viobservationsof
future exchange rates onthe viobservationsof current
exchange rates Then form the estimate of the expected future
exchange rate at time I, E t't+At fi+/J11z. Repeat this for t+l, t+2, etc. (See also
Hendry (198).)
OThemoving average adjustment of Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) is designed precisely
for handling the overlapping observations problem.
21Inaccordance with the theoretical predictions, the residuals from our regressions are24
InTable 5.1 we see that for regime lithe slopeof(5.2) is estimated to be less than
unity for all maturities and(moreor less) decreasinginmaturity: .78 for 1 month
maturity, .22 for3months maturity, -0.08 for6months maturity and0.06for12months
maturity. The latter threeare notsignificantly differentfromzero. We seethatthe
"t-values"for the slopes being less than unity are less than -3,hence the standard
Dickey-Fuller test rejects a unit root on a 5% significance level, and confirms mean
reversion, for all maturities.22 For regime I, the slopes are also less than unity and
decreasing in maturity. The slope for 6 months maturity is not significantly different
from zero, whereas the slope for 12 months maturity is significantly negative. The t-yalue
forthe slope for 1 month maturity being less than unity is -2.5, hence the unit root
hypothesis is not rejected even at the 10 percent significance level for that maturity.
The estimation results from Table 5.1 are illustrated in Diagram 5.2, Diagram 5.2
plots, for each maturity and each regime, the point estimate of the future exchange rate
within the band together with a 95 percent confidence interval, against the current
exchange rate within the band. That is, for each maturity the fitted values of equation
(5.2) and a 95 percent confidence interval are shown, for both regimes. The dashed lines
correspond to regime I, the solid lines to regime Ii.The boxes corresponding to
bandwidths 2.25 percent (regime I) and *1.5 percent (regime II) are also shown. The
empirical graphs in Digram 5.2 are to be compared with the theoretical graph in Diagram
5.1. The similarity with the theory is remarkable, except that the line for 12—month
maturity during regime I is negatively sloped. We also see that the estimated expected
future exchange rate within the band in that case falls below the (*2.25 percent) exchange
rate band for current exchange rates within the band above .75 percent from the central
parity. Hence, the 12-month maturity during regime I is unreasonable according to our
strongly serially correlated (in all cases), conditionally heteroskedastic (in most cases) and
non-normally distributed (in most cases).
22 The critical values for the 5 and 10 percent significance levels are —2.87 and —2.57, for
a sample size of 500 (Fuller (1976, Table8.52)).25
discussionabove,in this contextitis worth notingthat Swedishbanks were forbidden to
hedgelong-term forwardpositionsfreely untilMarch24, 1986. Thisresulted ina thinner
andlessefficient forward exchange markets for maturities longer than 6 months. Since
theEuro-depositand forwardmarket arecloselyrelated, the Euro-depositmarketin
honorwas affectedinthe same way. This gives additional supporttoourdecisionnot to
reportanyfurther estimatesfor12monthsmaturity duringregime J,23
As mentioned we have considereda number ofadditional explanatory variables. The
squareand cube of the currentexchange rates wereincluded in ordertocapture possible
non-linearities.The square and the cube were not significant, though, except that the
squarewassignificant for the 6-month maturity during regime I. The estimates of the
expected future exchange rates with the square and the cube included were not much
different from those when they were excluded.24Similar results were achieved by
estimating a logistic transformation of (5.2). (The logistic transformation makes sure that
the expected future exchange rate within the band cannot fail outside the band.)
A seasonal variable was included in order to capture a possible year cycle and end-of-the-
year effect. It was significant for 3 ,6and 12-month maturity during regime II but had
little effect on the estimates. Various la€s were included and some lags were significant
for the 6-month maturity during regime! and 1 and 12-month maturity during regime II.
23 The confidence intervals are computed under the assumption that the estimated
coefficients in Table 5.1 are asymptotically normal. Then the estimated expected future
exchange rates within the band are also asymptotically normally distributed. However,
we know that the estimated expected future exchange rate within the band cannot fall
outside the exchange rate band and that the conditional distribution is likely to have a
non—normal shape within the band. Hovewer, the non—normal distribution may to some
extent be taken into account by the heteroskedasticity-consistent estimate of the
covariance matrix. Therefore it is likely that the confidence intervals could be narrowed
by explicitly using a truncated distribution. However, since in most cases the confidence
intervals are well inside the exchange rate band, anysuchmodification is likely to have a
small effect on the confidence interval. Consequently no such modification has been
undertaken.
24 For the FF/DM exchange rate Rose and Svensson (1991) find that the square and
cube of the current exchange rate are marginally significant. The coefficients have the
signs predicted by the theory and have some effect on the estimates.26
The estimated 1-month future exchange rate during regime II was more variable and
jagged than without the lags. The other cases of significant lags gave rise to unreasonable
estimates that fell outside the band for parts of the regimes. The interest rate differential
was induded, but it was only marginally significant for 1-mouth maturity during regime
H and had little effect on the estimated expected future exchange rate.
These specification tests hence confirm that the simple specification (5.2) generates
the most sensible results.
Several different estimation methods besides OLS were also used. Although OLS is a
consistent estimator, it is not necessarily the most efficient estimator. GARCHmay be
desirable since conditional heteroskedasticity has been documented for the krona by
Lindberg and Söderlind (1991b). (JARCU with the moving-average extension of Baillie
and Bollerslev (1990)leadto rather strange results, with constant expected future
exchange rates for as short maturity as 1 month. This holds also for the autoregressive
method. CARd without the MA-extension gave results similar to OLS. That error
terms are truncated and definitely non-normal make us skeptic about the use of GARCH,
though.That error terms are highly serially correlated because of overlapping
observations invalidates the assumptions for GARCH without the MA extension. Locally
weighted regression (LWR) gave results similar to OLS except for 6-month maturity
during regime I, for which case expected future exchange rates are constant for exchange
rates in the lower half of the band. This lack of non-linearities in a prediction equation
for the Swedish krona is very much in line with the findings of Lindberg and Soderlind
(1991b). RLS gave very volatile estimates for short windows of 1 year or less; a 2-year
window gave unreasonable negative slopes for 6 and 12-month maturity.
These results from alternative estimation methods confirms OLS with Newey-West
covariance matrix as the estimator that most consistently generates sensible results,
Expectedratesof depreciation within the band27
The estimated expected rates of depredation within the band, conditional upon no
realignment, are easily calculated as
(5.3) Et[zt÷Inorealignment]/r =[+
wherea hat () denotes estimates of the parameters fl andin (5.1) (displayed in Table
5.1)These estimated expected rates of depredation are plotted against time in
Diagram 5.Sa-d.Inaccordance with the discussion earlier, the results for 12 months
maturity in regime I are not shown.
Diagram 5.3a-d hence shows the amount of a4justment in interest rate differentials of
Diagram 2.2 that is warranted. We see that the aijustrnent often is of the same
magnitude as the interest rate differential, which is suggestive of the importance of going
further than just observing interest rate differentials when discussing devaluation
expectations. The results for 1, 3 and 6 months took quite similar. This is explained by
the fact that, according to Table 5.1, both and fl1 decrease approximately
proportionally to r. But, since the degree of mean reversion is very strong, the expected
exchange rate after 6 and 12 months are virtually the same and constant (see Diagram
5.2c and d). Hence, the expected rate of change of the exchange rate for 12 months is
about half of that for 6 months.
B. &timation of Devaluation Expectations
The estimates of the expected rate of devaluation are hence constructed according to
(3.18) by subtracting the estimated expected rates of depreciation in Diagram 5.3 from the




The resulting point estimates are displayed in Diagram 5.4, while Diagram 5.5 shows the
95percentconfidence intervals. As expected, the estimated expected rates of devaluation
are fluctuating over time and often of considerable magnitude. Moreover, the resultG are28
qualitatively similar to the results from the Simplest Test shown in Diagram 41. But,
theresultsin Diagram 5.4 are much more precise.It is interesting to compare the
previous Diagram 4.2 with Diagram 5.5. Diagram 4.2 showsthemaximal bounds for the
expectedratesol realignment, what we might call 100 percent confidence intervals. The
muchnarrower95 percent confidenceintervalsin Diagram 5.5 demonstratethegainin
precisionobtainedbyestimatingtheexpected rate of depredation within the band. (Note
thatthe vertical scales differ betweenDiagrams4.2 and 5.5, making the difference
between the two sets of confidence interval even larger than they at first appear.) The
maximal bound for the expected rate of realignment in regime U in Diagram 4.2 are
*6%, 3 and percent per year for 1,3,6 and 12 months, respectively. The
typical 95% confidence interval for the rate of devaluation in Diagram 5.5 are *2%,
*1% and percent per year, respectively. Hence, the gain in precision by estimating
the expected depreciation within the band is substantial, especially for short maturities.
The practical consequence of this can be exemplified by the estimates of the devaluation
expectations for 1 month maturity during the weeks preceding the devaluation on
October 8, 1982. Accorthng to the Simplest Test in Diagram 4.1, the result is inconclusive
since the forward rate is inside the band, but in Diagram 5.4a and 5.5a we see a markedly
significant positive estimate of the expected rate of devaluation.
Edin and Vredin (1991) have estimated expected rates of devaluation for the Nordic
countries with monthly data for the sample period January 1979-May 1989. They use a
method very different from ours. They follow Baxter (1990) and treat actual central
parities as censored variables that are adjusted to a shadow exchange rate only when the
difference between the shadow exchange rate and the central parity exceeds a threshold.
They estimate devaluation probabilities and devaluation sizes in a censored regression of
actual devaluations on selected macrovariables as explanatory variables.25 For the year
25 The selected macrovariables are nominal money stocks, foreign interest rates,
industrial productions, real exchange rates, foreign price levels and foreign exchange
reserves.29
1982 (which includes the one Swedish devaluation in the sample) their estimates of
expected rates of devaluationfor Sweden arefairly similar to ours. Throughout the period
January 1983-May 1989, however, their estimated expected rates of devaluation are zero,
whereas our estimated expected rates of devaluation fluctuate betwn -3 and +10
percent per year (the peak occurs during the unrest of June 1985). Their sample does not
extend beyond May 1989, so we do not know whether their method would indicate
positive expected rates of devaluation during the unrest in the Winter 1989/90 and in the
Fall of 1990.
There are several reasons why Edin and Vredin's and our estimates are not directly
comparable.First, they estimate objectiveprobabilitiesand sizes of devaluation
conditional only upon selected macrovariables, whereas we in a very direct way estimate
the market's subjective expected rates of devaluation, which may depend on a variety of
information. (In practice interest rate differentials and the exchange rates within the
band seem to be sufficient statistics for that information. Edin and Vredin's selected
macrovariables exclude the domestic interest rate and the current exchange rate, probably
because they are considered endogenous.26)Second, Edin and Vredin estimate
probabilities and sizes of devaluation during each month conditional upon values of the
macrovariables during the previous month. Since the macrovariables are published with a
lag, information about them actually becomes available during the month for which
devaluation probabilities and sizes are estimated. Therefore, in practice Edin and Vredin
estimate probabilities and sizes of currentdevaluationsconditional upon current
information, whereas we estimate expected rates of ftture devaluations conditional upon
26 Edin and Vredin's estimates of devaluation probabilities and sizes are objective in the
sense that they are derived from the data on the macrovariables regardless of what the
market's devaluation expectations actually were. (Perhaps one could say that they are
trying to find Nordic governments' central banks' decision rule for devaluations.) Our
estimates of expected rates of devaluation are subjectiveinthe sense that they extract the
market's devaluation expectations regardless of whether or not those expectations were
warranted by the the state of the economy (or by the behavior of governments and central
banks).30
current information, Nevertheless, even though Edin and Vredin's and our estimates are
not directly comparable, it is clear that they give very different results, and further
research is probably necessary to clarify why.
The expected time toa devaluation
Ingeneral, the expected rates of devaluation do not vary much across maturities.
This could, for instance, be consistent with devaluation expectations characterized by
general uncertainty about the end timing of the devaluation. This pattern could be
modeled as a jump process for devaluations with a random walk frequency of realignment,
as in Bertola and Svensson (1990).But,at certain instances there is a dear profile across
maturities of the expected rates of devaluation. These include the short period before the
devaluation in October 1982, the prolonged period around the general election 1985, the
very short period during the government crisis in February 1990 and also the late fall the
same year. Under the assumption that the expected conditional devaluation size is
constant across maturities, this can be used for a more precise estimation of the expected
timing of the devaluation. This assumption will be exploited below. To be more precise,
we will assume that the expected conditional devaluation sizewas 10 percent. This
number is fairly reasonable, given the Swedish experience, and the results would not
change much if we instead assumed, say, 7 or 13 percent. Given this assumption, it is
straightforward to calculate the estimated probability density for the time to realignment
ip1(r) according to (3.26). But unfortunately, we are not able to give good estimates of
the expected time to realignment Tt, given by (3.22). In order to do so we would need
estimates of the probability densities for maturities longer than one year (r>1). Forthe
sake of illustration, let us assume that the intensity A2(r) for maturities longer than one
year (r >1)equals the intensity for one year .X1(1). Then the expected time to a
realignment can be calculated and used as a summary indicator of the perceived timing of
devaluations.31
We shalllook atfour episodes withespeciallyhigh devaluation expectations.
Diagram &6a shows the estimatedprobability density for the time to realignment, w,(r),
given= 10percent for the period September-October 1982. The date I along the
horizontalaxisis measured in weeks, and the numbering follows the Swedish convention
of numberingtheweeks of ayear from1to 53.The dayof thedevaluation,October8,
1982, is marked bya dotted verticalline. The curves show the estimated density
functions plottedagainst t for r= 1,3, 6 and 12 months.According to
Diagram 5,6a, the timing of the devaluation of October 8, 1982, seems to have been
anticipated to a large extent. The probability densities were high for all maturities during
the month preceding the devaluation. Furthermore, the density for the 1 month maturity
took an upward jump about one week before the devaluation. Two dates in weeks 41 arid
42 (September 6 and 11), marked by arrows in Diagram 5.6a, are further analyzed in
Diagram .5.6b.InDiagram 5.6b, the probability density is plotted against maturity for
the two dates. Hence, this diagram is indeed our estimate of the density function for the
time to realignment, for maturities up to and including one year. On October 6, two
days before the devaluation, the probability density was very high for the 1 month
maturity and, more or less, successively smaller for longer maturities. Our estimate for
October 6 of the expected time to realignment T equals 13 months)' Six days and one
devaluation later, on September 11, 1982, the densities were zero or negative. The
negative densities are of course an anomaly and reflects either an error in assuming a
constant expected positive conditional devaluation sizealso alter the devaluation or,
more generally, that the expected rates of devaluation immediately after the devaluation
were not significantly different from zero, as can be seen in Diagram 5.4a-d.
27ObviouslyT1 is sensitive to assumptions about the intensity A1(r)forr> 1.For
instance, if we instead assumed that A1(r)= At(1)/2for r> 1,then our estimates of the
expected time to realignment would typically be about 30 percent longer at dates with
high devaluation expectations.32
During Spring 1985, the densitiesincreased dramatically for the 1,3 and6 months
maturities,as seen in Diagram 5.6c. One often stated explanation to this episode is the
fear of a devaluation in conjunction with a new government taking office after the general
election in September 1985 (as had happened in 1982). This is reasonable but probably
not the whole story, since it cannot explain the high densities in May 1985 for short
maturities. The uncertainly about the width of the exchange rate band (which was not
official) could possibly be the missing part of the explanation. On June 27, 1985, Sveriges
Riksbank narrowed the exchange rate band to1.5%(from s2.25%) and made it official.
This seems to have brought down the density for 6 months maturity during the course of a
few weeks, The densities for the shorter maturities were affected much less or not at all.
After that, the densities were more or less constant until two weeks after the general
election in week 37. Thereafter they fell steadily. Diagram 5.6d shows the density against
maturity for three dates in week 26 and 48 (June 26, June 28 and November 29) marked
by arrows in Diagram 5.6c. The densities for short maturities were very high both
immediately before and after June 27. The expected time to a realignment was about 8
months. On November 29, 1985 the densities for shorter mattrities have fallen
substantially and the density plot is virtually flat. The expected time to realignment was
then above 2.5 years.
Diagram 5. 7a shows the period January to March 1990 when the weak Swedish
economy and government crisis made the densities soar, especially for shorter maturities.
Hence, the market expected a devaluation soon. The turbulence settled very quickly,
though. This is further illustrated in Diagram .5.7b which plots the density function for
three dates in weeks 8 and 12 (February 19, February 23 and March 19). Here it is
evident that it was only the short maturities that were affected. The expected time to
realignment was 14 20 and 21 months at the three dates.
The episode of high devaluation expectations in late 1990 was longer than in February
1990, as shown in Diagram 5.lc-d, but a similar pattern across maturities is displayed.33
This implies that the market did not exclude the possibility of a devaluation before the
general election in September 1991, perhaps in conjunction with the tying of the krona to
the ecu.Theexpected time to realignment at the two dates (October 8 and October 18)
was 19 and 14 months1 respectively.
VI. Explaining Devaluation Expectations
In the previous section we estimated the markets devaluation expectations, regardiess
of the cause of these devaluation expectations. In this section in contrast, we will try to
shed some light on the cause of devaluation expectations. More specifically, we examine
whether the expected rates of devaluation that we have estimated above can be explained
by a set of macro variables. We do this by regressing estimated expected rates of
devaluation on &selectedset of macrovariables. Numerous specifIcations and hypothesis
can be considered. This section is not an exhaustive examination, but should only be seen
as containing the results for a few fairly obvious specifications.
Since the selected macrovariables are available only as monthly data, we have used
monthly averages of the estimated expected rates of devaluation as regressand. The
estimation method used is OLS with Newey-West (1987) standard errors, with 12
off-diagonal bands in the error covariance matrix. This allows for heteroskedastic and
serially correlated error terms.
The explanatory variables that we use appear in Table 6.].The selection of
explanatory variables was primarily based on theoretical considerations, but has also been
influenced by our experiences from the Swedish money and exchange rate market. We
started with a relatively large set of explanatory variables. The level of the real exchange
rate, the trade account, the inflation rate, the rate of nominal industrial wage growth and
the rate of industrial production growth were later excluded from the equations. In most
cases their coefficients were insignificant. In the remaining cases the excluded variables34
were strongly correlated with some of the remaining. The excluded variables had a
limited explanatory power as the exclusion only resulted in a minor drop of the R-square
values.2'
In the regression equation the explanatory variables reflect only the most recent
information available during month 1.The idea was to include the most important
variables in the current information set that agents might use in forming devaluation
expectations. The explanatory variables were consequently appropriately lagged or, in the
cases where a particular statistic is revealed sometime during the month, constructed as
averagesof lagged values."
The estimation results for the 3-month maturity are reported in Table 6.1. The
results for the other maturities were similar, except where noted below. The equation has
relatively high explanatory power. The current account has a negative effect on the
expected rate of devaluation, at a 1 percent signlfcance level. The rate of real exchange
25 For the regression equations in this section to be meaningful, it must not be the case
that the explanatory variables tried here are omitted variables and have explanatory
power in forecasting the future exchange rate within the band.
29 For instance, the current account is published with a six week lag. Therefore, as an
explanatory variable we use the average of the seasonally adjusted observation (or month
t-3 and month 1-2. The monthly unemployment observation becomes available with a
two week lag and enters the equation as an average of the seasonally adjusted observation
for month 1-2 and month 1-1. The central government borrowing requirement (seasonally
adjusted) and the change in foreign exchange reserves (due to private transactions) is
announced weekly. Thus both variables enter the equation asanaverage of their monthly
figures for month t-1 and month 1. The money supply, i.e. seasonally adjusted Ma, is
available with a time lag somewhere in the range of two and five weeks. Thus, the money
growth rate enters the equation as the average yearly growth rate during month 1-2 and
month 1-1. The real exchange rate, expressed in units of domestic goods per unit of
foreign goods, can be calculated with a two week lag, when the consumer price statistics
become available. For the rate of real exchange rate depreciation, several lags were
significant with similar coefficients, indicating that what effects the expected rate of
devaluation is the average rate of real exchange rate depreciation over a longer period
than 2-3 months. Therefore we use the average of the two 12-month rates of real
exchange depreciation that end in month t-2 and 1-1. The election dummy is equal to one
if the months September or October of an election year (1982, 1985 and 1988) occur
within the maturity, otherwise it is equal to zero.
Using an average of lagged variables implies an implicit restriction that the
coefficients of each lagged variable are the same. We have run regressions with the lagged
variables entering separately, and we have found that the hypothesis that the the
restrictions are fulfilled cannot be rejected.35
rate depredation also has a negative effect, which is marginally significant. Thai is, an
increase in the rate of real exchange rate depreciation (an increase in the rate of
appreciation of Swedish competitiveness) reduces the expected rate of devaluation. (The
effect of the rate of real exchange rate depreciation is not significant for the other
maturities, though.) The parliament elections have a positive effect, at a 1 percent
significance level. Finally the coefficient for the change in foreign exchange reserves is
positive and significant at a 1 percent level (the coefficient is not significant for the 6 and
12—month maturity). The coefficients of the unemployment rate, the money growth rate
and the government borrowing requirement are not significantly different from zero.
The significant coefficients have the expected signs except the coefficient for the
change in foreign exchange reserves.Surprisingly, an increase in the capital billow
increases the expected rate of devaluation. This result is due to the events after October
1990, when the Riksbank alter initial capital outflow and increases in interest rate
differentials orchestrated a dramatic increase in overnight and treasury bills interest rates.
This lead to a large capital inflow and an increase in foreign exchange reserves. A possible
interpretation is that the Riksbank increased reserves so as to better withstand possible
future devaluation speculation. If the observations from October 1990 on are excluded,
the coefficient for capital flows is no longer significantly different from zeroi' 3
Someexperience from the foreign exchange market suggest that market participants
30Themoney growth rate has a positive effect, on a 5 percent significance level, for the
6-month maturity. The rate of unemployment has a positive effect, on a 1 percent
significance level, for the 12-month maturity.
3'Duringthe dramatic increase of interest rate differentials in the Fall of 1990,
over-night and treasury bill interest rates "overshot" covered interest parity, and covered
interest parity was hence temporarily violated (during about a week for the 3-month
maturity, see Lindberg (1991)). Interestingly, Euro interest rates did not overshoot but
maintained covered interest parity.Therefore, the Euro interest rates (which we
consistently use) may have been more reliable data for the estimation of devaluation
expectations -
32 Koen(1991) regress short and long run interest rate differentials (relative to the DM)
of pooled ERM countries and Austria on selected macrovariables. Inflation differentials
relative to Germany and hard currency dummies have significant effects of the expected
sign.36
follow fads in the sense that they focus for a while on a particular variable in forming
devaluation expectations, then switch to focus on another variable for a while, etc. In
order to allow for this possibility, we have used rolling regressions (with a window of 36
months) to check the stability of the coefficients reported in Table 6.1.
We choose to report only the most interesting results for the 3-month maturity.
Diagram 6. Ia to 6. Id show the development of a 95 percent confidence interval for the
coefficients of the current account, the unemployment rate, the money growth rate and
the election dummy. The coefficients are plotted for the center of the windows. The first
window covers the period April 1982-March 1985 and the last covers the period February
1988-January 1991.
The coefficient of the current account is the most stable one. It has a significant
negative sign almost always, except during two periods in 1983 and 1988. The coefficient
of the unemployment rate shows a different pattern. In the beginning it is significantly
negative. Then, when the unemployment reaches a higher level at the end of the 1980's, it
gets a significantly positive sign. In the regressions on the whole sample period the
coefficient of the money growth rate was not significantly different from zero. However,
in the rolling regressions, money growth has a significant positive impact on tke expected
rate of devaluation for most of the sample period.Finally, the development of the
coefficient of the election dummy indicates that the effect of the election 1985 on the
expected rate of devaluation was considerable large. The effects of the elections 1982 and
1988 were on the contrary quite modest.
The results from the rolling regressions confirm that several coefficients were unstable
over the sample period which is consistent with the idea of the market's focus shifting
between different macrovariables.33
13Jmay appear that an alternative to regression on lagged variables in the information
set is regression on leaded variables. The idea would be that market agents may have a
variety of information on which we lack data. This information is used by market agents
to form consistent expectations of future devaluations and future macrovariables. By
rational expectations the forecast errors on the realized values of these future37
VII. Conclusions
We have apptied several methods to estimate devaluation expectations for the
Swedish krona during 1982-1991. First we used the simplest test, with the minimal
assumption of no positive minimum profit. We found expectations of a devaluation, and
hence a lack of credibility for the exchange rate band, within a 12-month horizon for a
good part of the sample, in particular towards the end. Within shorter horizons, we also
found a lack of credibility on some occasions, but the test is mostly inconclusive for
shorter horizons and cannot tell whether the exchange rate band is credible or not.
Under the assumption of uncovered interest parity, we were able to estimate
devaluation expectations with greater precision, and also to compute confidence intervals
and conduct statistical hypothesis tests. The method consists of adjusting the interest
rate differentials by subtracting expected rates of exchange rate depreciation within the
band- This way we have estimated expected rates of devaluation, with appropriate
confidence intervals, for thehorizons1, 3, 6 and 12 months. We have found that the
expected rates of devaluation are usually significantly positive for most of the sample
period, not only for the 12-month horizon but also for shorter horizons down to 1 month.
The expected rates of devaluation were never significantly negative, except briefly in the
Spring of 1984.
The main conclusion is that the exchange rate band for the krona has almost always
lacked credibility during the sample period. The unilateral exchange rate target zone has
thus not provided full credibility. It remains to be seen whether the recent unilateral peg
to the ecu, the declaration that Sweden intends to apply for status as an associated
macrovariables should be uncorrelated with everything in the current information set. The
leaded macrovariables should therefore be potential explanatory variables in regressions
on the expected rates of devaluation. As far as we can see, such regressions would be
misleading, since a Peso problem would enter. In practice we would end up takin
realized values conditional upon no realignment having occurred, which would be biase
relative to the unconditional expectation of the variables.38
member of EMS as soon as this option becomes available, the Swedish application for
membership in the EC, and the recently appointed government commission on the status
of the central bank wilt be associated with reduced devaluation expectations.
The adjustment of interest rate differentials require the estimation of expected rates
of depredation within the exchange rate band. We have employed a variety of estimation
methods and specifications. A simple linear specification, OLS estimation of coefficients,
and Newey-West estimation of the covariance matrix consistently deliver sensible results.
Exchange rates within bands are not martingales but display strong mean reversion;
estimated expected rates of depredation within the band are often of the same magnitude
as interest rate differentials, in particular for short maturities.This makes the
adjustment of interest rate differentials essential to the precise measurement of
devaluation expectations.For maturities longer than 12 months, though, estimated
expected rates of depreciation within the band are fairly small and the adjustment of
interest rate differentials does not matter much.
We have devised a method to estimate probability densities for the time to a
devaluation. Normally the probability density does not change much, but around a few
critical dates there seem to be considerable shifts in the expected timing of a devaluation.
We have examined how devaluatioii expectations can be explained by regressing
estimated expected rates of devaluation on selected macrovariables. The results indicate
that the current account surplus has a significant negative effect on devaluation
expectations, and that an election dummy has a significant positive effect. The rate of
real exchange rate depreciation has a marginally significant negative effect for the
3—month maturity. Several coefficients are unstable over time, consistent with the idea
that market agents in forming devaluation expectations focus on a particular
macrovariable for a while, and then shift to another.For instance, the rate of
unemployment has a positive effect on devaluation expectations towards the end of the
sample period.39
If the assumption of uncovered interest parity is not accepted, anyone with a specific
ideaofthe size and sign of the foreign exchange risk premium can easily adjust the
estimated expected rates of devaluation accordingly. More generally, a confiaenct interval
for the foreign exchange risk premium is easily added to the confidence intervals already
estimated. Even with as large an interval (or the foreign exchange risk premium as
1 percent per year most of our coridusions are not affected.40
Appendix
1. Several Independent Rnlignments Possible during ft,t+r] (a Marked Poisson Procs)31
We fixthedate t, and considerthe time interval[t,t+r],r0. We let N1(r)=0, 1,
2, ..., denotethenumberof realignmentsduring (t,t+r].Supposethe occurrence of
realignments isdescribedby a Poissonpointprocess. Let the Poisson process be"doubly
stochastic." That is, the rate at which realignments occur is itself a stochastic process.
Let A1(r)0(r 0) denote the stochastic rate at which realignments occur at time t+r,
the stochasticintensity. Then theprobability ofarealignment occurring during thesmall
time interval[t+r,t+r+Ar](Ar> 0)is .At(r)Ar+o(Ar).
Now,introduce the (expected) intensityfunction A(r) ￿ 0 (r ￿ 0), definedas A1(r)
Et[A1(r)], the expected rateat which realignments occur at time t+r, conditional upon
informationavailable at time t. The intensity function hastheinterpretation that the
probability of a realignment occurring during the small timeinterval[t+r,t+r+Ar]
(Ar> 0 ), conditional upon informationa available at time t, is At(r)Ar + o(Lsr).The
treatment of doubly stochastic processes is much simplified by the fact that the stochastic
intensity can be replaced by the conditionally expected intensity (see Snyder (1975,
Chapt. 6). In the rest of the appendix, all intensities, expectations, probabilities and
distributions are conditional upon information avialable at time t, unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
The crucial property of a Poisson process is that future evolution of the process is not
affected by past realizations. More precisly, ithas independentincrements; (orr1 <r2c
< r4, Nt(r2)_N,(ri)andNt(r4)_N(r3)areindependent. Thismeansthat the above
probability of a realignment during a small time interval does not depend on whether or
not any realignment has just occurred before the time interval. We find this property of
thePoisonprocess completely unrealistic as a description of actual realignments, and
34 See Snyder (1975) for details on and terminologyof random pointprocesses.41
therefore we have chosen a modified, "self-exciting," process below. A self-exciting
process is a process where the future evolution is affected by past realizations. In order to
describe the sell—exciting process, it is illuminating to first describe the Poisson process.
Theparameter functionAt(r) is the integral of the intensity function, Ae(r) E
fA1(u)du. The parameter function will benon-decreasingand fulfill At(O) =0. Fora
Poisson process the number of realignments during [t,t+rJ is Poisson distributed with
parameter At(r),
(A1.1) Prob{N/t) =ii) = [A/r)1/(n!)]exp[—A1(r)1, ii= 0,i,..,
and the expected number of realignments during [t,ti-r] is
(A1.2) Et[Nt(r)] =A/r).
Let the Poisson process be a "marked" point process. That is, with each realignment,
"point," there is associated a random variable, "mark," in our case the size of a
devaluation.Let the expected conditional size of a devaluation at time t+r, ,be
independent of the maturity and denoted by i. The expected devaluation (size) during
[t,t+r], gr, then fulfills
(A1.3) gr =E,[N/r)]=A/r)r
Itfollows that, conditional upon a given ,anestimate of intensity function can be
computed by
(Al.4) A1(r) =gr/i1.
2. At Most One Devaluation Dining [t,t+i (?> 0) (a Self-Exciting Point Process)
With the marked Poisson process above, one or several realignments can occur during
[t,t+r]. Also, the probability of each new realignment is independent of whether any have
just occurred. We find this unsuitable for describing actual realignments and prefer to
modify the process so that there is a finite } >0,such that the possibility of more than
one realignment during [t,t+]canbe disregarded.This means that the process is
self-exciting, since the occurrence of a first realignment affects the occurrence of a second,42
at least for some time. Conditional upon a realignment not occurring during [t,t+rl, the
probability of a realignment occurring during the small interval [t+r,t+r+tsr](At>0) is
+ o(At). Conditional upon a realignment occurring during [t,H-rJ,(01 r ￿
the probability of a realignment occurring during the small interval [t+r,t+r+Ar] is zero.
In order to derive the probability of a realignment during [1,t+r], p, introduce qt(T)
1 -theprobability of no realignment during (t,t+r]. We have
(A2.l) q(r+Ar)Prob{no realignment during [t,t+r+AtJ}
sProb{norealignment during It,t+r]FProb{no realignment during [r,r+At]}
Eq1(r).(1
—.A/r)tsr +o(At)).
Wecan rewrite this to get
(A2.2) [q(r+tsr) - [-A(r) + o(tst)/tsr]q(r).
Taking the limit when tsr-sO gives the differential function
(A2.3) 0q1(r)/Or =





In order to identify the probability density function, ct(r), of the time to a
realignment, we observe that
(A2.6) Prob{realignmentduring fr,r+Ar]}
=Prob{realignmentduring [r,r+ArJ no realignment during [t,t+r]}.
Prob{norealignment during Et,t+rI
=A(r)Ar.exp[_Ai(r)],
where we for simplicity disregard the terms of order o(At).
Let the expected conditional devaluation size, ,beindependent of the maturity and
denoted by .Theexpected devaluation during (t,t+r], gr, fulfills
(A2.7) =
p7z.43
It foUows from (A2.7) and (A25) that an estimate of the intensity function, conditional
upon a given ,canbe computed by identifying
(A2.8) 1 -exp[-A/i-}=gr/.
We notice the difference between (A1.4) and (A2.8). According to (AlA) fora
marked Poisson process the ratio between the expected devaluation and the conditionaj
devaluation size equals the expected number of devaluations, which equals the value of the
parameter function. According to (A2.8), for the self-exciting marked process described
above, the same ratio equals the probability of a realignment, which equals one minus the
exponential of the negative of the value of the parameter function.
We also note that
(A2.9) 1 —exp[-A/r)j=I-Eo[_At(r)J'/(n!)=At(r) +
Forshort maturities and small values of the intensity function, the parameter function is
small arid the right-hand side is apprwdmately equal to At(r),inwhich case the the two
realignment models give similar estimates of the parameter function. However, since in
our case the ratio between the expected devaluation and the expected conditional
devaluation size is sometimes not far from unity, the two models give rather different
estimates.44
Table 5.1. OLS estixnaUon of erpected future exchange rates, (5.2)
Maturity




Intercept -.00 -.05 -.56 -1.32
(.06) (.17) (.32) (.19)
Slope .85 .60 -.15 -1.27
(.06) (.16) (.52) (.37)
Diagnostics
N 776 698 580 386
R-squared .66 .24 01 .35
a .45 .70 .84 .73
Regime 2
(85:06:27 —91:02:17)
Intercept —.13 —.46 —.64
—.51
(.06) (.18) (.19) (.18)
Slope .78 .22 -.08 .06
(.06) (.19) (.19) (.18)
Diagnostics
N 1337 1299 1235 1123
R-squared .60 .04 .005 .004
a .34 .53 .54 .56
OLSon (5.2) with Newey-West standard errors within parentheses(lags equal to each
maturity).Exchange rates within the band are measured in percent log deviation from
central parity. The number of observations decrease with maturity since observations
corresponding within one maturity are excluded at the end of each regime, and before the
realignment during regime I.45
Table 6.1. Regression of estimated eipected rate of devaluation




(SEK billion per month) (23)




(SEK billion per month)
Rate of money growth .oi
(percent per year) (.005)





Change in foreign exchange reserves .13"





Newey-West standard errors within parentheses (12 lags). The sample period is April
1982-January 1991. A *denotessignificance on a 5 percent level, "on a 1 percent level.
Data were obtained from Sveriges Riksbank, IFS and Monthly Digest of Swedish
Statistics, Statistics Sweden,46
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